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EU External Relations and International Law: 
Divergence on Questions of ‘Territory’? 
EU External Relations and International Law 
Paul James Cardwell and Ramses A Wessel 
 
I. Introduction 
The European Union is not a state. Yet, it is increasingly involved in territorial questions, 
either of its own or of other states. Notions of territory and jurisdiction are central in 
international law.1 Indeed, state sovereignty implies that states are the sole rule makers and 
rule enforcers within a jurisdiction that is intrinsically linked to their physical territory. This is 
obviously different for international organisations,2 also considering that during the process of 
drafting the Convention on the Law of Treaties, the International Law Commission (ILC) had 
difficulties in accepting the existence of a ‘territory of the organization’.3 While the EU will 
largely leave internal border disputes to be settled on the basis of international law,4 territorial 
questions are increasingly important, not just in relation to the changing role of borders in its 
internal market, but also in the context of its role as a global actor. As a maturing legal 
system, the possibility of divergence from international law is thus pertinent.5 In that context, 
the main question that this chapter explores is if and how the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) has used international law in the adjudication of (incidental) territorial matters 
that have arisen in the course of interpreting agreements with third states.  
The competences of the EU to make and enforce rules within a given ‘territorial 
space’ are undisputed.6 These days we are witnessing an extension of that ‘territorial space’. 
The increasing membership of the EU is the most obvious factor causing the territorial scope 
 
1 cf Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
2 cf Article 29 (on the ‘Territorial scope of treaties’) of the 1986 Vienna Convention essentially copied Article 29 
of the 1969 Convention and provides: ‘Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise 
established, a treaty between one or more States and one or more international organizations is binding upon 
each State party in respect of its entire territory.’ It is interesting to note that, while international agreements 
concluded by international organisations are included, the obligations are imposed on ‘each State party’ only. 
3 The 1982 ILC Commentary explains this choice in the following terms: ‘Is it possible to imagine a parallel 
provision concerning the obligations of international organizations? Despite the somewhat loose references 
which are occasionally made to the “territory” of an international organization, we cannot speak in this case of 
“territory” in the strict sense of the word. However, since this is so and since account must nevertheless be taken 
of the variety of situations which the multiple functions of international organizations may involve, it seemed 
preferable to avoid a formula which was too rigid or too narrow. If the draft articles said that, in the case of an 
international organization which is a party to a treaty, the scope of application of the treaty extended to the entire 
territory of the States members of that organization, the draft would diverge from article 29 of the Vienna 
Convention by raising the question of the scope of application of a treaty, which is not expressly covered by that 
Convention.’ 
4 See pending Case C‑457/18 Republic of Slovenia v Republic of Croatia ECLI:EU:C:2019:1067 in which the 
Advocate General on 11 December 2019 argued that the issue of determining the boundary between those two 
States is a matter of public international law. 
5 See the Introduction by Elaine Fahey to this volume. 
6 We leave aside the fact that there continue to exist territorial disputes between EU Member States, eg between 
the UK and Spain (Gibraltar), or Slovenia and Croatia.  
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of the Union to change. Needless to say, a decrease in official members via the exit of the UK 
from the EU is an unprecedented situation, though less so when framed in terms of ‘territory’ 
rather than ‘membership’.7 But the ‘global reach’ of EU law,8 and the extent to which external 
territories fall within that scope, is even more important and less definable by reference to 
physical territory. Citizenship, boundaries and jurisdiction are three interlocking elements that 
have strong relationships to ‘territory’. Nonetheless, the EU is treaty-bound not only to 
respect, but to uphold international law:9 an obligation which has come under increased 
scrutiny.10 All of this leads to the conclusion that the special nature of the EU and the transfer 
of a number of competences from the Member States to that organisation, cause it to be more 
active in relation to territorial questions than ‘regular’ organisations. As the EU does not exist 
in isolation, but is very well connected to other areas and levels of international law, the EU 
cannot escape these questions.11  
Therefore, rather than convergence as a process, we are looking primarily at 
divergence. Since EU law was, at the outset at least, a creation of international law then the 
starting point would be that on such fundamental questions as territory, definitions should be 
the same. However, in the context of the EU as a maturing legal system, the aim of the 
present chapter is to consider the extent of divergence between EU and international law. 
There are two strands to the chapter. First of all—using an internal perspective—it will 
examine the effects of EU norms and rules by looking through a ‘territorial’ lens and by 
considering the EU’s own definition and understanding of territory in its legal order. 
Second—using an external perspective—it will specifically look at the response by one of the 
EU institutions—the CJEU—in cases where international territorial questions have arisen. 
These have generally arisen when the Court of Justice has been faced with the highly 
problematic matters of the territorial application of EU law and bilateral agreements with 
third states as indications. The continued prevalence of occupied (or at least disputed) 
territories around the globe has resulted in a line of case law before the Court which at times 
seems to force it into deciding matters which go beyond the role envisaged for it in the 
original Treaty. Though questions on territorial scope are some of the most politically-
charged in international law, they often emerge through seemingly mundane and technical 
matters of trade. This part of the chapter explores the extent to which the Court, which was set 
up to deal with matters of EU law and not to resolve ‘general’ international law quandaries, 
 
7 Greenland, though remaining part of the Kingdom of Denmark, left the EU in 1984. Further back still, former 
various territories de facto left the EEC/EU when gaining independence: most notably Algeria (previously a full 
part of France) in 1962. 
8 Elaine Fahey, The Global Reach of EU Law (Routledge, 2016). 
9 Article 3(5) Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
10 Jed Odermatt, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union: International or Domestic Court’ (2014) 3 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 3, 696–718. 
11 See for instance the various contributions to Bart Van Vooren, Steven Blockmans and Jan Wouters (eds), The 
EU’s Role in Global Governance: The Legal Dimension (Oxford University Press, 2013); as well as, in 
particular, Arts 3(5), 21 and 22 of the TEU. See more extensively: Ramses A Wessel, ‘Flipping the Question: 
The Reception of EU Law in the International Legal Order’ (2016) Oxford Yearbook of European Law; Ramses 
A Wessel, ‘Studying International and European Law: Confronting Perspectives and Combining Interests’ in 
Sacha Garben and Inge Govaere (eds), The Interface between International and EU Law (Hart Publishing, 
2018). See further: Fahey (n 8); Dmitry Kochenov and Fabian Amtenbrink (eds), The European Union’s 
Shaping of the International Legal Order (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jed Odermatt, The European 
Union as a Global Actor and its Impact on the International Legal Order, PhD thesis (University of Leuven, 
2016); Penelope Nevill, ‘The European Union as a Source of Public International Law’ (2013) Hungarian 
Yearbook of International Law and European Law 281–95 (Eleven International Publishing, 2014); Frank 
Hoffmeister, ‘The Contribution of EU Practice to International Law’ in M Cremona (ed), Developments in EU 
External Relations Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 37–127. On the EU and other international 
organisations, see Ramses A Wessel and Jed Odermatt (eds), Research Handbook on the European Union and 
International Organisations (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019). 
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has developed its own methods to grapple with such inherently ‘political’ and thorny 
questions. Although the Court is only one institution in the EU framework, its judgments 
reveal the legal position of the Union on an increasing number of territorial questions. 
 
 
II. Internal EU Territorial Issues 
A first step to assess divergence with international law is to map the various ways in which 
territorial questions come up within the European Union and to what extent the Union has 
made of the notion of territory. The present section will subsequently address various 
dimensions related to territory: nationality and citizenship, and jurisdiction and extra-
territorial effects. First, however, we will briefly revisit how the EU treaties deal with 
questions of territory. 
 
A. Territorial References 
The European Union has considered territorial questions from the outset and there are many 
references to ‘territory’ in the EU Treaties. Yet, most of these are related to the Member 
States’ territories.12 Article 52(2) Treaty on European Union (TEU) points to the territorial 
scope of the Treaties as specified in Article 355 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), which in turn lists the overseas territories belonging to some of the 
Member States and the extent to which EU law does or does not apply.13 While it is mainly in 
this context that references by the Court to the ‘territory of the EU’ may be found,14 it has 
been claimed that ‘it is clearly possible to speak of the emergence of the concept of Union 
territory, given the autonomous demarcation of the territorial application of EU law defined in 
the Treaties’.15 Indeed, one may also find some hints at the possible existence of an ‘EU 
territory’ in the Treaties. Thus, Article 3(3) TEU refers to the Union’s objective to ‘promote 
economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States’. At the same 
time ‘It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s 
cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.’ References like these are meant to create some 
unity while preserving the diversity, and the objective of ‘territorial cohesion’ has merely 
been the driver behind the allocation of the so-called cohesion funds aimed at ‘reducing 
disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of 
 
12 See extensively as well as much more in detail on these provisions, Dmitry Kochenov, ‘European Union 
Territory from a Legal Perspective: A Commentary on Articles 52 TEU, 355, 349, and 198-204 TFEU’ in 
Manuel Kellerbauer, Marcus Klamert and Jonathan Tomkin (eds), The EU Treaties and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights – A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2019); also available as University of 
Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper 2017-05; available at SSRN https://ssrn.com/abstract=2956011 (last 
accessed 13 March 2020). 
13 Two Declarations (43 and 60) are attached the Treaty, both of which concern potential future changes to the 
status of French and Dutch territories. 
14 See for instance the frequent use of the term ‘Community territory’ in Case 177/95 Ebony Maritime SA and 
Loten Navigation Co Ltd v Prefetto della Provincia di Brindisi and others ECLI:EU:C:1997:89. Other cases in 
point may be Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi ECLI:EU:C:2011:124 and 
Case C-434/09 Shirley McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department ECLI:EU:C:2011:277. cf  
Dmitry Kochenov, ‘A Real European Citizenship; A New Jurisdiction Text; A Novel Chapter in the 
Development of the Union in Europe’ (2011) 18 Columbia Journal of European Law 56. 
15 Kochenov (n 12). 
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the least favoured regions’.16 In a way, ‘economic, social and territorial cohesion’ intends to 
view the territories of the Member States as a whole, which is reinforced by the commitment 
to remove internal frontiers (for example, Article 3(2) TEU on the area of freedom, security 
and justice). 
 Yet, the absence of a genuine EU territory—or at least an acceptance of the continued 
existence of state territories—is underlined by the Treaty on European Union: 
 
The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their 
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, 
inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, 
including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and 
safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of 
each Member State.17 
 
At the same time, these State territories are even to be defended on the basis of a collective 
security rule: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other 
Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in 
their power […].18 
Similarly, the EU’s security and defence policy may be used in ‘the fight against 
terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories’, 
and the so-called ‘solidarity clause’ calls upon both the Union and its Member States to ‘act 
jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim 
of a natural or man-made disaster’.19 
More clear notions of a possible ‘EU territory’ can be found when the ‘territorial 
application’ of the Treaties is concerned. First of all, the Treaties apply to the EU Member 
States (which are all mentioned by name).20 This is further specified in relation to the so-
called countries and territories overseas, which leads to an extension of the territorial scope of 
the EU.21 This latter provision provides that EU, in principle, applies to Guadeloupe, French 
Guiana, Martinique, Mayotte, Réunion, Saint-Martin, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary 
Islands. For all other overseas countries and territories (including this of the UK, the Åland 
Islands, the Faeroe Islands, or the Netherlands’s Antilles) specific rules are to be found in Art 
355 and in particular in Annex II of the Treaty. That one could perhaps indeed see this as an 
‘upscaling’ of ‘European territory’ is underlined by Art 198 TFEU: 
 
The Member States agree to associate with the Union the non-European countries and 
territories which have special relations with Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. These countries and territories (hereinafter called the ‘countries and territories’) are 
listed in Annex II. The purpose of association shall be to promote the economic and social 
development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between 
them and the Union as a whole. 
 
This association brings the non-European countries and territories clearly within the reach of 
EU law and policies. They have a right to the same treatment as the EU Member States, for 
 
16 Art 174 TFEU. 
17 Art 4(2) TEU. Emphasis added. 
18 Art 42(7) TEU. 
19 See Arts 43 TEU and 222 TFEU respectively. 
20 Art 52 TEU. 
21 Art 355 TFEU. 
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instance in relation to trade and investment.22 At the same time, the existence of overseas 
territories may have territorial implication under, for instance, the law of the sea, in particular 
where these territories may result in an additional economic exclusive zone (EEZ) to be used 
for fishing and possible mining activities. Thus, while Greenland is not part of the EU, its 
location does make it a place of interest to the EU in terms of debates on the future of the 
Arctic area. 
 In addition, EU ‘territory’ is also extended within Europe as ‘The provisions of the 
Treaties shall apply to the European territories for whose external relations a Member State is 
responsible’ (para 3). Although the geographic scope of the EU has undergone seven rounds 
of enlargement between 1973 and 2013 (with the additional incorporation of the former 
German Democratic Republic into the Federal Republic of Germany), it should be noted that 
the scope has also shrunk. Although the United Kingdom is the first Member State to ever 
leave the EU, Greenland left the Union in 1984 (though it remains part of the Kingdom of 
Denmark) and the independence of former colonies—such as Algeria from France—have 
changed the political map of Europe, and its frontiers. 
 Although we cannot see a divergence from international law approaches as such, the 
approach of the EU Treaties to ‘territorial questions’ is quite specific and largely deals with 
the (extended) territories of Member States and primarily in relation to the application of EU 
law. Despite the fact that the Treaties do not refer to ‘EU territory’ as such, some territorial 
concepts clearly hint in that direction, as will also be considered below. 
 
 
B. European Citizenship 
The ‘idea’ of EU territory comes back in the clear link between territory, nationality and 
citizenship. While in international law, nationality is related to statehood, citizenship can also 
be granted to others living on the territory of that state.23 It is the latter notion that returns in 
EU law and ‘European citizenship’ is a key element of the process of European integration. 
Art 30(2) TFEU inter alia provides: ‘Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be 
subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties. They shall have […] the right to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States’. Indeed, the territory of all Member 
States; the rights of European citizens have largely been harmonised and European citizenship 
is frequently used by the CJEU to rule on extensive rights for individuals. Citizenship has thus 
become an essential element in the right to seek or accept jobs, to start a business or to 
provide cross-border services. At the same time, European citizenship entails  
the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which they 
are nationals is not represented, the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any 
Member State on the same conditions as the nationals of that State […].24  
 
Hence, outside the EU a European citizen may rely on the help of another EU Member State. 
Thus, the traditional national diplomatic and consular assistance is extended to an EU-wide 
 
22 Art 199 TFEU. 
23 cf Kay Hailbronner, ‘Nationality in Public International Law and European Law’ in Rainer Bauböck, 
Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 European States (Amsterdam University Press, 
2006). 
24 Art 23 TFEU. Emphasis added. 
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system of protection of European citizens abroad. Links with international diplomatic and 
consular law become ever more visible. New developments in EU diplomacy indeed reveal at 
least an ambition of the EU to act on behalf of its Member States in situations of diplomatic 
protection and consular assistance. European Union Delegations can increasingly be 
compared to national Embassies.25 
While currently the idea of ‘supranational citizenship’26 can most easily be seen as a 
dimension of the European integration process, it has been argued that the existence of the 
phenomenon could allow for a more general separation between states and (single) 
citizenship:  
This belonging to a polity, expressed in purely legal terms, is the real novelty of the European 
model, replicable in other geographical areas or global organizations – which could generate - 
one day - their one partial citizenships - and it opens the door to multiple and cumulative 
citizenships, not conflicting among each other, to communities partially overlapping.27 
 
While ‘European citizenship’ could thus be seen as deviating from the clear link between 
statehood and nationality that can be found in public international law, it is at the same time 
clear that EU citizenship does not endow the EU with competences states would generally 
have under international law to protect their nationals. In international diplomatic and 
consular law, the notion of nationality remains crucial. New developments in EU diplomacy 
reveal at least an ambition of the EU to act on behalf of its Member States in situations of 
diplomatic protection and consular assistance. This clearly highlights the parallels between 
being a national of a state and a European citizen.28 The Brexit debate in the UK has similarly 
highlighted how citizens perceive the addition of EU citizenship to national citizenship, and 
the intrinsic difficulties in retaining rights obtained by virtue of EU citizenship.29 
Overall, the notion of ‘European citizenship’ does not seem to have led to changes in 
the international law notions on nationality and the rights states have in the protection of the 
rights of their nationals abroad.30 
 
C. Jurisdiction and ‘Extra-Territorial’ Effects of EU Law 
So-called ‘extra-territorial effects’ of EU law and their impact on international law receive 
more and more attention in EU legal scholarship.31 As phrased by Joanne Scott: 
 
25 Pia Kerres and Ramses A Wessel, ‘Apples and Oranges? Comparing the European Union Delegations to 
National Embassies’ CLEER Papers, No 2, 2015. 
26 See Francesca Strumia, Supranational Citizenship and the Challenge of Diversity: Immigrants, Citizens and 
Member States in the EU (Brill| Nijhoff, 2013). 
27 Susanna Cafaro, ‘Peculiarities of a Supranational Citizenship’ (21 November 2016), available on 
www.linkedin.com/pulse/peculiarities-supranational-citizenship-susanna-cafaro (last accessed 13 March 2020). 
28 Ramses A Wessel, ‘Can the European Union Replace its Member States in International Affairs? An 
International Law Perspective’ in Inge Govaere, Erwan Lannon, Peter Van Elsuwege and Stanislas Adam (eds), 
The European Union in the World: Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) 
129–47; Ramses A Wessel and B Van Vooren, ‘The EEAS’ Diplomatic Dreams and the Reality of International 
and European Law’ (2013) Journal of European Public Policy 9, 1350–67. 
29 Willem Maas, ‘EU Citizenship and Free Movement after Brexit’ in Scott Greer and Janet Laible (eds), Europe 
after Brexit (Manchester University Press, forthcoming in 2020). 
30 In that context, Advocate General Maduro emphasised the principle of international law that ‘questions of 
nationality are in principle within the reserved domain of States’. Case C-135/08 Janko Rottman v Freistaat 
Bayern ECLI:EU:C:2009:588. 
31 cf Joanne Scott, ‘Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law’ (2014) 62 American Journal of 
Comparative Law; Joanne Scott, ‘The New EU Extra-Territoriality’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 
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the EU makes frequent recourse to a mechanism that may be labelled ‘territorial extension.’ 
The practice of territorial extension enables the EU to govern activities that are not centered 
upon the territory of the EU and to shape the focus and content of third country and 
international law.32  
 
This may also lead to jurisdictional questions, eg with respect to international law notions of 
the concept.33 
While the EU rules are, obviously, primarily related to relations between the EU 
Member States, these rules often affect or influence other legal systems. While part of this is 
related to an intentional ‘export’ of norms (see our earlier references to the notion of the EU 
as a ‘normative actor’), other effects flow from an adoption of norms of standards by other 
states to, for instance, allow access to the EU market. This is usually referred to as ‘the global 
reach of EU law’.34 As Fahey argues, this includes the effects of EU regulatory standards on, 
for instance, US rules in the realm of inter alia genetically modified foods, data privacy 
standards and chemical safety rules or even the transposition of EU environmental standards 
in some US states.35 This is believed to stretch the EU’s legal influence beyond its own 
territory, and could perhaps indeed be seen as an ‘upscaling’ of the EU’s territorial 
jurisdiction. In the words of Fahey: 
 
Included in these theorisations is the view that the size and scale of the EU, as a market and as 
a polity, has generated what is understood here as ‘rule-transfer’. It has entailed that the EU 
has adopted rules and standards that other polities and markets have in turn adopted, compelled 
to do so or acting out of sheer necessity.36 
 
Debates on this issue are related to the question to what extent the EU can be a global 
normative actor. The brief—reflected in for instance Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU—is quite well 
known. At the same time questions of the extra-territoriality of the EU’s own Charter of 
Fundamental Rights seem to have remained unsolved, since the territorial scope of the Charter 
is undefined. In fact, the issue of extra-territoriality of the Charter and the opposing views of 
Advocate General (AG) Mengozzi in X and X v Belgium (against the adoption of the extra-
territoriality standard developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and in 
favour of an autonomous understanding of the territorial scope of the Charter) and the one of 
 
1343; Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (Oxford University Press, 
2020). 
32 Ibid at 89. In this paper, Scott is actually challenging the notion of ‘extra-territoriality’ as it is commonly used 
in the literature, and draws attention to ‘territorial extension’: ‘a measure will be regarded as extraterritorial 
when it imposes obligations on persons who do not enjoy a relevant territorial connection with the regulating 
state. By contrast, a measure will be regarded as giving rise to territorial extension when its application depends 
upon the existence of a relevant territorial connection, but where the relevant regulatory determination will be 
shaped as a matter of law, by conduct or circumstances abroad’ (ibid at 90). For the present contribution it 
suffices to note that both notions are relevant to underline the need to understand both international and EU law 
systematics. 
33 A case in point was formed by the Ebony Martime case, where the question arose of the compatibility of an 
EU Regulation on the enforcement of sanctions and the freedom of the high seas under international law. See 
Ebony Maritime (n 14). 
34 Fahey (n 8). 
35 Fahey (n 8) at 1 
36 Fahey (n 8) at 1. 
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AG Wathelet (adopting the effective control standard developed by the ECtHR) shows the 
potential of divergence from the notion of human rights law ‘jurisdiction’.37 
Questions of ‘extra-territoriality’ indeed imply questions of jurisdiction. At least as far 
as enforcement is concerned, in international law, state jurisdiction is traditionally quite 
closely linked to territorial notions, and it has also been discussed by both the CJEU and the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) as such.38 In fact, jurisdiction can be seen as the exclusive 
competence of states to set and enforce the rules on its territory.39 It is well-known that part of 
these jurisdictional competences has been transferred to the EU, both where the creation and 
the enforcement of norms is involved. Fahey has argued that the merger of sovereignty, 
territoriality and jurisdiction in a global world is an emerging matter for EU law.40 In the case 
of enforcement, we do however see differences. Where enforcement of competition law is 
clearly in the hands of EU institutions (or national authorities acting as agents of the EU), 
enforcement of criminal law, for instance, is still left to the Member States.41 Yet, again 
territorial jurisdiction is stretched as, under certain conditions, Member State authorities may 
operate on the territory of other Member States.42 
 The question is to what extent these developments will push the jurisdiction back to a 
more controllable territory and in that sense to a closer convergence of EU law and traditional 
international law notions of jurisdiction. But in order to appreciate the full extent of the extra-
territorial nature of EU law, it is also necessary to examine the specific implications of EU 
law when questions relating to the territories of third states come to light. 
III. The CJEU and External Territorial Implications of EU Law 
The above section aimed to provide insight into how questions of territory form part of, and 
have been defined in, the context of the EU’s internal set up. Next to ‘internal’ questions of 
territory, the European Union’s expanding activities as a global actor increasingly force it to 
be engaged in international territorial questions. These external territorial implications of EU 
law can arise in a number of ways. As the EU’s competences have expanded, the EU finds 
itself dealing with ‘newer’ areas, such as migration from third countries and the interface with 
international law in both a general sense and in its more specific dimensions (eg protection of 
refugees). The closeness of relationships between the EU and third states, whether those in the 
European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein), complex bilateral agreements 
 
37 Violeta Moreno-Lax and Cathryn Costello, ‘The Extraterritorial Application of the Charter: From Territoriality 
to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model’ in Steve Peers, Tamara K Hervey, Jeff Kenner and Angela Ward (eds), 
Commentary on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart Publishing, 2014) 1657–83; Cedric Ryngaert, ‘EU 
Trade Agreements and Human Rights: From Extraterritorial to Territorial Obligations’ (2018) 20 International 
Community Law Review 374; Lorand Bartels, ‘The EU’s Human Rights Obligations in Relation to Policies with 
Extraterritorial Effects’ (2015) 25 European Journal of International Law 4 1071–91. 
38 Jed Odermatt, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the European Union: Between 
Fragmentation and Universality of International Law’ in Achilles Skordas (ed), Research Handbook on the 
International Court of Justice (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming in 2020); also available as Jed Odermatt, 
‘The International Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the European Union: Between Fragmentation and 
Universality of International Law’ (10 April 2019). Forthcoming in Achilles Skordas (ed), Research Handbook 
on the International Court of Justice, Edward Elgar; iCourts Working Paper Series No 158, available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3369613 (last accessed 13 March 2020). 
39 See, much more extensively: Ryngaert (n 1). 
40 Fahey (n 8) at 12. 
41 See for instance Art 88(3) TFEU: ‘Any operational action by Europol must be carried out in liaison and in 
agreement with the authorities of the Member State or States whose territory is concerned. The application of 
coercive measures shall be the exclusive responsibility of the competent national authorities.’ 
42 cf Art 89 TFEU. 
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(Switzerland), neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean or, indeed, across 
the North Sea, brings into focus the uncertainty surrounding territorial scope. This section 
focuses on the capacity to make international agreements, ie when the EU enters into a 
contractual agreement with a third state and how this can lead to considerations of ‘territory’ 
to which the CJEU in particular has had to confront. 
 The EU benefits from both express and implied competence to conclude international 
agreements. Express competences to conclude agreements are littered throughout the Treaty, 
and include: Article 8(2) TEU on agreements with neighbouring countries; Article 37 TEU on 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); Article 79(3) TFEU on readmission of 
third country nationals; Article 207 on common commercial policy; Article 212 TFEU on 
economic, financial and technological cooperation with third countries; and Article 216–219 
TFEU on a general competence for international agreements. The ERTA doctrine43 established 
long ago the principle of implied external competence when the EU benefits from internal 
competence.44  
 As such, there are estimated to be over 1,100 agreements concluded by the EU with 
almost all states around the world.45 Almost inevitably, therefore, the EU and its power to 
make agreements is likely to be caught up in questions of application to territory. This is 
particularly the case since many territorial disputes, occupied territories and breakaway 
regions are found in Europe and its neighbourhood.46 An agreement may cover the territorial 
scope of the provisions, but this is unlikely if the international consensus and the view of the 
third state on where frontiers lie do not align. 
 It is futile, however, to suggest that the EU is merely a technocratic body, with the 
Court of Justice merely applying rules to specific situations. The whole project of European 
integration, and its increasing focus on developing its role as an external actor in international 
affairs, means that these inevitably collide. The EU’s considerable economic weight, the 
values it seeks to promote via its external (and internal) identities and its legal/contractual 
relations with third state mean the Court is not merely responding to disputes but doing 
something more. As Kontorovich has commented, ‘the European Union is a self-consciously 
“normative power,” channelling its economic policies to reflect substantive legal norms’.47 
Where complex and multi-faceted questions relating to territory arise in international 
relations, political means are often deployed to find a compromise or middle ground. For 
example, neither the EU nor its Member States have official diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan: as such, the EU does not have a Delegation in Taipei but rather an ‘Economic and 
Trade Office’ which serves much the same function. Similarly, in recognition of the fact that 
not all EU Member States recognise the statehood of Kosovo, EU documentation relating to 
Kosovo (which is nevertheless recognised as a potential candidate for future EU membership) 
makes consistent references to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 
1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.48 
 
43 Case 22/70 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities.  
(ERTA) ECLI:EU:C:1971:32 
44 See more extensively Ramses A Wessel and Joris Larik (eds), EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (Hart Publishing, 2020) Ch 4. 
45 See EU Treaties database available at  http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do (last accessed 13 
March 2020). 
46 Eugene Kontorovich, ‘Economic Dealings with Occupied Territories’ (2015) 53 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 584, 588. 
47 Ibid. 
48 See, eg, Commission, ‘2019 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy: Kosovo* 2019 Report’ COM(2019) 
260 final (29 May 2019) available at https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-
kosovo-report.pdf (last accessed 13 March 2020). 
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 The Court of Justice has been faced with questions of territorial scope on a number of 
occasions. Courts are, of course, able to find means to ‘fudge’ all kinds of difficult matters, 
but the purpose of a court is to render a definitive decision, which makes the possibility of an 
inability to find a compromise on a significant territorial question pertinent. The Court 
therefore needs to tread carefully if it is to ensure that its decisions do not amount to an 
effective change in the relationship between the EU and its Member States and the third 
country/ies or territories in question. This can involve not in fact characterising the issue as 
one essentially relating to territory at all. For instance, Anastasiou49 was a case concerning 
Cyprus, before it became an EU Member State, and its preferential trade agreement for goods. 
The Commission’s policy on accepting certificates from Turkish Cypriot authorities was not 
consistent. When faced with a preliminary reference case concerning direct imports from 
northern Cyprus, the CJEU refused to recognise export certificates from authorities other than 
those belonging to the Republic of Cyprus (that is to say, those which bear the name ‘Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’)) under the EC-Cyprus agreement. To do so would 
represent ‘a denial of the very object and purpose of the system’, ie of the agreement 
concluded by the (then) EC with the Government of Cyprus.50 The Court did not engage with 
points made by Greece that recognition of certificates issued by TRNC would amount to a 
violation of Security Council resolutions calling upon all states not to recognise the entity.51 
However, it did emphasise, ‘The existence of different practices among the Member States 
[that] creates uncertainty of a kind likely to undermine the existence of a common commercial 
policy and the performance by the Community of its obligations’.52 Thus, this decision 
allowed the Court to adopt a cautious approach53 to avoid the territorial dimension and the 
accompanying political elements by relying on the lack of recognition of the ‘TRNC’ rather 
than the reasons or justification for the non-recognition.54 
 In Brita, the Court was faced with a similar but more complex question than in 
Anastasiou of whether goods originating from the West Bank could be included within the 
EU’s free trade agreement signed with the State of Israel55 and benefit from the preferential 
treatment allowed for Israeli products in the EU. The EU also has an interim agreement with 
the Palestinian authority.56 This was referred to the CJEU by the Hamburg Finanzgericht after 
Brita attempted to annul the customs duties which the German authorities said were owed, 
due to the products (listed as being from Israel) coming from the West Bank.57  
 AG Bot58 and the Court of Justice were both of the view that the German Court should 
not allow the goods to benefit from the preferential treatment regime allowed under the 
agreement. However, their reasoning was rather different. AG Bot put great emphasis on the 
context of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (of which the EU, Israel and Palestine are all 
part) and the question of how to be certain as to the ‘real’ origin of products. The Court of 
 
49 Case C-432/92 Anastasiou (Pissouri) and Others ECLI:EU:C:1994:277. 
50 Ibid, para 41. 
51 Panos Koutrakos, ‘Legal Issues of EC-Cyprus Trade Relations’ (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 2, 489–98. 
52 Ibid para 53. 
53 Marise Cremona, ‘Case C-432/92, R. v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S.P. Anastasiou 
(Pissouri) Ltd. and others, Judgment of 5 July 1994’ (1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 1, 125–13. 
54 Stefan Talmon, ‘The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice’ (2001) 12 European Journal of 
International Law 4, 727–50. 
55 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one Part, and the State of Israel, of the other part (2000) OJ L146. 
56 Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European 
Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian 
Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of the other part, (1997) OJ (L187. 
57 Case C-386/08 Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen ECLI:EU:C:2010:91. 
58 Opinion of AG Bot, C-386/08 Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen ECLI:EU:C:2009:674. 
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Justice, on the other hand, started its decision with reference to the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties 1969 and ‘general international customary law’. It found that although there 
is a general level of trust required behind contracting parties, this does not prevent the 
Member State authorities from peering behind the verification of goods to ascertain their 
actual origin. Given that the Israeli authorities had not responded to clarification requests by 
the German authorities, the Court found that the latter could not simply make an ‘elective 
determination’ as to whether the goods should enter under the agreement or not. This would 
mean the national authorities unilaterally interpreting the scope of the agreement. 
 The Court in Brita was willing to refer to international law, but only so far. The AG 
explicitly referred to Security Council resolutions calling upon Israel to withdraw from the 
occupied territories for the purpose of determining the territorial scope of the Agreement.59 
However, the Court did not engage with this. Rather, it relied on the principle of the relative 
effect of treaties to interpret the agreement, which some commentators found unconvincing.60 
The Court underlined the importance of the respect for customary international law as a 
justification for its decision. The Court did not refer to the ‘internal’ position of the EU via the 
Commission’s notice, but rather placed the emphasis on the ‘locations which have been 
placed under Israeli administration since 1967’ as understood in international law. In a sense, 
therefore, international law came to the ‘rescue’ of the CJEU, even though the Vienna 
Convention does not formally bind the EU or all its Member States. It is hardly overstating 
the obvious that neither the German courts nor the CJEU would wish to be seen as defining 
the borders of Israel, but in this case the Court avoided adopting a unilateral European view 
on territory. Neither did the Court—unlike AG Bot—appear to fully use the content of the 
UNSC Resolutions to underline its position. Yet, interpreting this as a divergence from 
international law would be unfair. International law arguments do form the background of 
decisions like these and it is hard to find examples of a clear deviation of EU law. 
Another case in point is the Front Polisaro saga. In December 2016, the Court of 
Justice61 set aside a judgment of the General Court,62 which had annulled a Council Decision 
on an agreement with Morocco for reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricultural products, 
in so far as it applied to the territory of Western Sahara. The Front Polisaro, a liberation 
movement in the Western Sahara, brought an action for annulment in the General Court via 
Article 263 TFEU. The contested decision was an agreement for an Exchange of Letters 
between the EU and Morocco on agricultural liberalisation measures amending and replacing 
protocols of the EU-Morocco Association Agreement. This differed from Brita because the 
EU has not concluded association agreement concerning products form Western Sahara with 
any other state.63 The agreement referred only to the ‘territory of the Kingdom of Morocco’. 
Front Polisaro brought an action based on 11 pleas in law, claiming that the decision 
approving the application of the agreement to Western Sahara was unlawful. The General 
Court dismissed the pleas, but nevertheless annulled the decision in so far as it approved the 
application to Western Sahara. The Court’s decision was based on the failure of the Council 
to ‘fulfil its obligation to examine all the elements of the case before the adoption of the 
 
59 Ibid paras 111 and 108–12. 
60 Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘A Higher Law for Treaties?’ in E Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna 
Convention (Oxford University Press, 2011) 425, 432; Guy Harpaz and Eyal Rubinson, ‘The Interface between 
Trade, Law and Politics and the Erosion of Normative Power Europe: Comment on Brita’ (2010) 35 European 
Law Review 551, 562. 
61 Case C-104/16 Council v Front Polisario (2016) EU:C:2016:973.(Court of Justice) 
62 Case T-512/12 Front Polisario v Council (2015) ECLI:EU:T:2015:953 (General Court) 
63  Front Polisario (General Court), ibid, para 97. 
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contested decision’ which related to commitment to fundamental rights in the EU Charter, a 
reasoning noted as ‘a somewhat surprising move’.64   
 Of interest here is the question posed by the General Court:  
whether there is an absolute prohibition against concluding an international agreement on 
behalf of the European Union which may be applied to a territory in fact controlled by a non-
Member State, without the sovereignty of that State over that territory being recognised by the 
European Union and its Member States or, more generally, by all other States (‘the disputed 
territory’) and, where relevant, the existence of discretion of the EU institutions in that regard, 
the limits of that discretion and the conditions for its exercise.65  
The Court responded in the negative, finding that there is no absolute prohibition on 
concluding an agreement with a third state which may be applied to a disputed territory.66 
Furthermore, there was a marked reluctance in this instance to defer to international law. This 
‘might partly be motivated by its reluctance to imply that the EU may have acted in violation 
of international law, which in turn could bring with it questions as to the EU’s international 
responsibility’.67 
 The Council successfully appealed to the Court of Justice, which set aside the decision 
of the General Court. The Court noted in its decision that ‘the Association Agreement did not 
include any interpretation clause or any other provision which would have the consequence of 
excluding that territory from its scope’.68 Furthermore, the Court’s view that the General 
Court found that the agreement also applies to the territory of Western Sahara was based, ‘not 
on a finding of fact, but on a legal interpretation of that agreement made by the General Court 
on the basis of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention’.69 The Court felt the General Court erred 
in law that the Western Sahara was tacitly included in the Association Agreement.70 
 For the purposes of the discussion here, the Court’s analysis of ‘territory’ is worth 
citing in full: 
 
it thus follows from that rule [the customary rule codified in Article 29 of the Vienna 
Convention], placed in the context of the interpretation of Article 94 of the Association 
Agreement, that a treaty is generally binding on a State in the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the term ‘territory’, combined with the possessive adjective ‘its’ preceding it, in respect of the 
geographical space over which that State exercises the fullness of the powers granted to 
sovereign entities by international law, to the exclusion of any other territory, such as a 
territory likely to be under the sole jurisdiction or the sole international responsibility of that 
State. 
In that regard … it follows from international practice that, where a treaty is intended to apply 
not only to the territory of a State but also beyond that territory, that treaty expressly provides 
for it, whether it is a territory ‘under [the] jurisdiction’ of that State, … or in any territory ‘for 
whose international relations [that State] is responsible.71 
 
 
64 Sandra Hummelbrunner and Anne-Carlijn Prickartz, ‘It’s not the Fish that Stinks! EU Trade Relations with 
Morocco under the Scrutiny of the General Court of the European Union’ (2016) 32 Utrecht Journal of 
International and European Law 83, 19–40. 
65 Front Polisario (General Court) (n 63) para 117. 
66 Front Polisario (General Court) (n 63) para 215. 
67 Front Polisario (General Court) (n 63) para 40 
68 Front Polisario (Court of Justice) para 84 
69 Front Polisario (Court of Justice) para 81 
70 Front Polisario (Court of Justice) para 108 
71 Front Polisario (Court of Justice) (n 60), paras 95–96. 
 19 
With this in mind, the Court appeared to back away from its view in Brita, where the 
consideration of the entry of goods under the separate agreement with the Palestinian 
Authority was a factor in the Court’s reasoning. Here, the Court appeared to place less 
emphasis on assessing what the EU’s commitments were towards a territory effectively 
controlled by a partner state, whilst at the same time reaffirming that it was upholding 
international law. The difficulty, as some have noted, is that it means in effect that the CJEU 
has de facto allowed the EU to be complicit in ‘over a decade long infringement of the right to 
self-determination’.72 
The way in which the Court, somewhat selectively, applied international law in this 
case, has been criticised in the literature. As argued by Kassoti, 
 
… the Court’s artificial and selective reliance on international law in Front Polisario adds a 
new dimension to the ever-burgeoning debate on the relationship between international and 
EU law. In the past, the Court has arguably shown a great deal of judicial recalcitrance towards 
international law and a tendency to guard its own identity and the autonomy of the EU legal 
order through its reluctance to engage with international law. However, the Front Polisario 
judgment manifests a different and more worrisome judicial strategy. While seemingly 
anchoring its findings in international law, the Court, in essence, showed here a great degree of 
willingness to stretch international rules on treaty interpretation to a breaking point in order to 
avoid addressing the political disinterest that the EU has demonstrated in relation to the 
situation in Western Sahara.73 
 
Front Polisario was followed up by a similar case one year later. In Western Sahara,74 the 
Court again had to assess the validity of an international agreement (the EU-Morocco 
Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) and its 2013 Protocol) and the EU implementing acts. 
Again, the question concerned application of the agreement to the territory of and products 
originating in Western Sahara. In Western Sahara, the Court again extensively applied 
international law, also to determine the EU’s own obligations. By accepting Morocco’s 
sovereignty over the Western Saharan waters, the EU would, inter alia, accept Morocco’s 
breach of the right to self-determination of Western Sahara (and thus, the EU might also be 
found responsible for that breach by way of complicity).75 As in Front Polisario, a way out 
was found in arguing that ‘Moroccan fishing zones’ did not include Western Sahara territory; 
hence, the agreements did not, in the eyes of the Court, apply to any illegally occupied 
territory. 
The issue of rules of origin relating to Israel returned to the Court of Justice following 
a preliminary reference from the French Conseil d’Etat in a decision delivered in November 
2019.76 AG Hogan, in his opinion of 13 June 2019, pointed to ‘the need to make a clear 
 
72 Vivien Kube, ‘The Polisario Case: Do EU Fundamental Rights Matter for EU Trade Policies?’ (EJIL:Talk, 3 
February 2017), available at www.ejiltalk.org/the-polisario-case-do-eu-fundamental-rights-matter-for-eu-trade-
polices/ (last accessed 13 March 2020). 
73 Eva Kassoti, ‘The Council v. Front Polisario Case: The Court of Justice’s Selective Reliance on International 
Rules on Treaty Interpretation (Second Part)’ (2017) 2 European Papers 23–42, 40. 
74 Case C‑266/16 Request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the High Court of Justice 
(England & Wales), Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court) (United Kingdom), made by decision of 27 
April 2016, received at the Court on 13 May 2016, in the proceedings The Queen, on the application of: Western 
Sahara Campaign UK v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, Secretary of State for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs EU:C:2018:118.  
75 But again the Court seems to have been selective in using international law arguments. See Eva Kassoti, ‘The 
ECJ and the Art of Treaty Interpretation: Western Sahara Campaign UK’ (2019) 56 Common Market Law 
Review 209. 
76 Case C‑363/18 Organisation Jive Européenne, Vignoble Psagot Ltd v Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:954. 
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distinction between products originating in the territory of Israel and those originating in the 
West Bank’77 as the Court had decided in Brita. But the emphasis on Israeli settlement policy 
as being ‘a manifest breach of international law’78 is striking, alongside his reminder to the 
Court of the EU’s Treaty-based commitment to the strict observance of international law.79 
The Grand Chamber of the Court decided that foodstuffs originating in a territory occupied by 
the state of Israel must bear not only the indication of that territory but also, where those 
foodstuffs come from a locality or a group of localities constituting an Israeli settlement 
within that territory, the indication of that provenance. In doing so, the Court considered the 
settlements to be ‘in violation of the rules of general international humanitarian law’.80 Whilst 
the rationale for doing so was the important aspect of consumer choice, the Court engaged in 
a more direct assessment of what constitutes a ‘state’ and ‘territory’ and explicitly referring to 
the ICJ and UNSC resolutions, which seem to have been welcomed by international 
lawyers.81 In this case, although concerning the same geographical area, the law in question 
was different from Brita. But it does show that the Court was less inclined to avoid or ignore 
international law and on this basis, in a somewhat unlikely setting of ruling on consumer 
choices, convergence between EU and international appears to be a reality.  
How the CJEU views ‘territory’ is a prism by which to understand the relationship 
between EU and international law. The very fact that in Western Sahara, the CJEU made the 
case to be one about territory is significant. The CJEU framed the issue to be one of territorial 
application of the agreements (and tied issues of standing to that question). It could have also 
framed the question of whether the EU policy had effects on the right to self-determination; 
whether it legally recognised an illegal situation, etc. In the Court’s mind, it frames the issues 
in terms of territory in these cases.82 If the view of commentators since Kadi is that the Court 
is ‘much less open to international law’,83 then we can also expect that the Court uses the 
sources of international law and opinion as a means of justifying its normative choices. Front 
Polisaro and Western Sahara suggest that the Court has also shifted somewhat from its post-
Brita characterisation as adopting a ‘dualist’ approach to international law in the EU legal 
order. However, this does not make the CJEU particularly different from national courts, 
which are often required to rule on the effects of international law too. And as decisions 
demonstrate, both the quantity and quality of international law for the Court to draw on has 
increased dramatically.84 By contrast, the recent Organisation juive européenne decision once 
again shows that it is difficult to generalise and that the Court continues to have in its cannon 
a number of approaches to questions of territory (including avoiding the discussion of 
territory completely) which leave it open to charges of inconsistency.85 
 
 
77 Opinion of AG Hogan in Case C‑363/18 Organisation juive européenne, Vignoble Psagot Ltd v Ministre de 
l’Économie et des Finances ECLI:EU:C:2019:494, para 57. 
78 Ibid para 55 
79 Ibid para 58, citing Article 3(5) TEU. 
80 Organisation Juive Européenne (n 74) para 48. 
81 Joseph Weinzierl, ‘An Unlikely Couple: Informed Consumer Choice in EU Law and the Middle East Conflict’ 
(Völkerrechtsblog, 14 November 2019).  
82 We are grateful for discussions with Jed Odermatt on this point. 
83 Odermatt (n 10) at 697 
84 Christina Eckes, ‘International Law as Law of the EU: The Role of the ECJ’ (November 2010) in Enzo 
Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti and Ramses A Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) CLEER Working Paper 2010/6 17 available at 
SSRN https://ssrn.com/abstract=2096203 (last accessed 13 March 2020). 
85 Olia Kanevskaia Whitaker, ‘EU Labelling Practices for Products Imported from Disputed Territories’ (2019) 
TILEC Discussion Paper No 2019-15, available at 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3421419 (last accessed 13 March 2020). 
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IV. Conclusion 
The very existence of the EU itself has posed a challenge to our understanding of what 
constitutes ‘territory’ and its association with citizenship, boundaries and jurisdiction. The 
fact that the Court is now increasingly faced with complex, and politically sensitive questions 
relating to the territory of third states, can be traced back to the Court’s own assertion of the 
‘new legal order’ of EU law back in Van Gend en Loos.86 Had the Court not done so, then it 
may not have attracted the type of preliminary references, such as in Brita and Organisation 
juive européenne, that would have allowed it to develop the autonomous legal order concept 
of the EU. A doctrine by which the Court does not hear ‘political’ cases would in all 
likelihood not be helpful, since the very cases which have been confronted have been of a 
technical nature and relating to the physical import of goods. What remains open to the Court 
is often the possibility to find ways of avoiding answering questions head on which would 
have ramifications far beyond the confines of EU law. The cases above show where this 
technique has been deployed, but with the risk of inconsistency of practice that give much less 
direction to the other institutions as to how such questions should be treated in the law. 
 Therefore, an equally surprising point in considering the notion of ‘territory’ is that the 
focus of discussion is on the Court of Justice and not the other ‘executive’-led institutions. A 
view on what constitutes the territory of a third state would normally be expected to come 
from a government/executive branch. In the EU sense, it is even more stark that the Court has 
been left to give a ruling on an essential matter of foreign policy, since the CFSP is 
deliberately functioning on the basis of distinct rules and procedures—and with a more 
limited scope granted to the Court to oversee it.87 The ability of the Court to impact on what 
the other institutions have in mind when dealing with territorial disputes may be limited88—
but is dependent of course on the Court having the opportunity to do so. As per the case law 
above, these opportunities often arise from unlikely areas in relation to foreign policy, such as 
consumer choice. 
 It is difficult to see, however, how the Court could do anything other than a case-by-
case resolution depending on the highly context-specific nature of the cases. It would be futile 
to suggest, for example, that the Court could spearhead a singular view of how EU 
agreements apply to third countries. But it is equally futile to suggest that the Court of Justice 
would be any more at ease with defining the borders of Israel than the national German Court 
that referred the Brita dispute to it. In this respect, it seems that the Court’s oscillation 
between asserting the autonomous legal order of the EU and examining the purpose of the 
agreements as well as their scope, to relying on a more deferential approach to international 
law, can be explained by its desire to find a normative solution to a technical problem. 
 In short, understanding the internal and external aspects of the EU through a prism of 
‘territory’ is enlightening—both of the unsettled nature of the international system on 
seemingly basic questions as to what constitutes a ‘territory’ and also the EU’s contribution to 
the legal order, which goes beyond what was originally intended as a role for the Court. Our 
short overview of internal and external dimensions of the way in which territorial questions 
are approached by the EU, not only underlines the ‘specificities’ of the EU as a non-state 
entity in a state-centred world, but also reveals the attempts by the Court and other institutions 
to find arguments within the realm of public international law. The tendency not to create 
 
86 Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen ECLI:EU:C:1963:1 
87 See Christophe Hillion and Ramses A Wessel, ‘The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Three Levels of Judicial 
Control over the CFSP’ in Steven Blockmans and Panos Koutrakos (eds), Research Handbook on EU Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018). 
88 See, eg, the contributions to Marco Balboni and Giuliana Laschi (eds), The European Union Approach 
towards Western Sahara (Peter Lang, 2017). 
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divergence is fully in line with the well-known open attitude of the EU towards international 
law and its so-called ‘Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit’.89 The question is whether the further 
development of the Union as an international and diplomatic actor will not force the 
international legal system to accept a certain deviation. 
 
 
89 See on this discussion already Cannizzaro, Palchetti and  Wessel (n 82). 
 
